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Abstract 
Over recent years, many forms of inter-organisational collaboration have gained in 
popularity. IT outsourcing is a particular form of collaboration and, while cost savings and 
other benefits forecast in the early days of the outsourcing boom have not always 
eventuated, the approach has retained much of its popularity. It is becoming increasingly 
apparent, however, that we still have some way to go in understanding how outsourcing 
arrangements actually work in practice. In particular the many failed ventures indicate that 
managing these partnerships is no trivial matter. Here, we report on an IT outsourcing 
venture, where interface management’s failure to take into account the needs of one of its 
most successful Divisions destroyed a major source of that Division’s competitive advantage 
– its information systems support function. We describe how that Division developed and 
attempted to employ a system dynamics model to protect its operations and functions. We 
then use a further model based on the same paradigm to illustrate how power/ political 
considerations meant that its efforts were always likely to fail. 
Keywords 
Outsourcing, organisational power and politics, system dynamics 
INTRODUCTION 
…Unless and until we are willing to come to terms with organisational power 
and influence, and admit that the skills of getting things done are as 
important as the skills of figuring out what to do, our organisations will fall 
further and further behind. The problem is, in most cases, not an absence of 
insight or organisational intelligence. Instead the problem is one of passivity. 
(Pfeffer, 1992:12) 
As an array of organisational collaborations gain momentum in popularity, it is becoming 
clear just how difficult it really is to manage complex relationships between partners and, 
more specifically, it appears that alliances are much easier to form than to manage. This 
paper outlines how, in the rush to align with others, management often unthinkingly destroys 
the very basis of competitive advantage residing in previous organisation designs and work 
practices. We report on a recently completed study of an IT outsourcing venture, in which 
the particular needs of one of the outsourcing company’s most strategically important and 
highly successful Divisions were neglected during both the establishment of the venture and 
in the detailed interface planning phase. The impact on the Division’s IT operations – a 
major source of its success – was devastating. Moreover, our study graphically illustrates 
the effect that dysfunctional political activity can have on the crucial issue of the retention 
and cultivation of the intellectual capital residing in expert personnel. 
Alongside a more traditional concern with issues of structure and human resources 
management, sometimes enlivened by acknowledging the cultural domain, over the last 
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decade there has been a rising interest in the dimensions of power and politics to explain 
some of the richer and often intangible aspects of organisation processes and behaviour. 
This is hardly surprising given increasing organisation problems related to distribution and 
inequities of power, competition for resources, the link between power, authority, and 
leadership, and especially the challenge of the ongoing dynamics of organisational change 
that threaten traditional power bases. As Buchanan and Badham (1999:1) put it: 
There is clearly enhanced scope for political manoeuvring in a less well-
ordered and less disciplined organisational world. There is also clearly a 
greater need for a critical understanding of the shaping role of political 
behaviour in such a context. 
We have also moved from a romantic view of power as personal attributes, through a 
modernist approach that associates power with structure and position, to a postmodern view 
that understands power being about relationships. There is also the acceptance of the ways 
in which current change management is inextricably linked with power and politics in 
increasingly complex, uncertain and ambiguous organisational environments. As Mintzberg 
(1983) emphasised some time ago, being an effective change agent implies a willingness 
and capability to engage in the political process of organisation change. On the other hand, 
it is equally important to recognise the interdependency of the cast of characters in change 
and the power and politics enmeshed in their actions and interactions. 
While these changes in theoretical and practical developments have occurred they have 
largely focussed on micro-individual and team relationships within organisations. What 
hasn’t been widely discussed is the nature of such power and politics from both a strategic 
and tactical perspective across organisations in partnering and collaborative relationships. 
This includes both the more positive and negative faces of power and politics. 
Space limitations do not permit a detailed presentation of our study. Briefly, the approach 
adopted is pluralistic (rather than unitary), multidisciplinary, largely qualitative and inductive. 
Semi-structured interviews, group-based model development and observation were major 
tools. Instead of the traditional economics or strategy approach, the authors employed an 
inter-organisational field approach (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997) coupled with a systems 
dynamics perspective. We do acknowledge the difficulty, however, of capturing soft or 
behavioural variables central to collaboration, given the complexity and multidimensionality 
of inter-organisational relationships (Parkhe, 1993). 
Our paper is organised as follows: in the following section we briefly review some theoretical 
issues surrounding inter-organisational collaboration. The second and third sections contain 
our case study narrative and a system dynamics view of some crucial aspects of the 
outsourcing operation respectively. We then present an extended model, developed to 
highlight power/ political impacts. Finally, we present our conclusions. 
CHANGE, COLLABORATION AND THE ‘DARK SIDE’ 
Inter-organisational collaboration and cooperation, whilst not new to this decade, has been 
revisited by scholars and practitioners, fascinated by its energetic adoption as a means of 
gaining competitive advantage. Cooperative relationships may be defined as those special 
affiliations between at least two organisations, aimed at pooling resources, having joint 
activities, and grounded in a strategic base designed to enhance competitive advantage. 
Such relationships should, ideally, be guided by a sound respect for organisational 
autonomy and individuality, and emphasise some type of long term or permanent 
commitment. They range from very tight approaches, such as joint ventures, to broader 
strategic alliances and more arm’s length, extremely loose, forms of collaboration. What 
appears necessary and sufficient for strategic alliances per se is retention of independence, 
sharing of benefits and performance control, and maintaining ongoing contributions to one or 
more strategic areas (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). 
Cooperative strategies are changing the very face of organisational life, especially in high-
technology organisations. Furthermore, what is evident in the burgeoning growth of inter-
organisational collaboration, is its increasing complexity and the way it alters the very nature 
of business, competition, organising and management, both nationally and internationally.  
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Collaborative ventures move beyond mere economic rationalism and formal transaction 
processes. As complex, multi-tiered social systems, they involve social and political 
dimensions – both intra and inter-organisational, and the vital nexus between organisation 
and external environment (including government). Not surprisingly then, some of the central 
planks of effective organisational collaboration reside in issues of appropriate coordination 
approaches, trust, communication, and the vitality of interpersonal relationships. The role of 
cultural compatibility is also important (More and McGrath, 1996). 
Kumar and Thibodeaux (1990) have emphasised that when change is major and 
transformative, the political awareness and facilitation that is appropriate at more micro-
departmental and sub-systems changes, must be matched with actual political intervention 
involving key stakeholders and an array of political tactics – both overt and covert. In the 
case study outlined in this paper, the major change initiative was that of outsourcing, utilising 
specialist IT suppliers to supposedly do a more efficient job than that formerly done in-house 
by Gigante.  
While dominant rationales for outsourcing follow the old adage of ‘stick to your knitting’ re: 
central core competencies, achieving critical mass, and the like (see e.g. Caddy et al., 
2001), the practice really took off in the 1990s, following hard on the heels of the 
reengineering boom. Drawn on by the lure of major savings, what Deal and Kennedy (2000) 
refer to as ‘corporate amputation’ continues apace, with major firms such as DuPont, J.P. 
Morgan and Lucent Technology outsourcing their IT businesses. Many specialist employees 
with scarce competencies are also riding high in this environment. 
Yet there is a dark side to this form of change and inter-organisational collaboration. Some 
employees lose their jobs and many organisations lose their valuable in-house skills and 
control of their destinies. For many the bubble of savings bursts to reveal illusion and 
inefficiencies. No wonder, then that Deal and Kennedy (2000) believe that the since the late 
1970s, the single most culturally destructive management trend is that of outsourcing, 
especially in its dysfunctional impact on participation, loyalty, and organisational 
commitment. 
From a theoretical perspective there is much to be done, although the pace of research in 
this area has certainly accelerated over the last few years. As Ebers (1997:15) suggests: 
“…we still have some way to go before we can claim that we sufficiently understand when, 
where, why, and how organisations form which kinds of inter-organisational relationships 
and to what effect.” Moreover he emphasises the importance of two under-researched yet 
important areas – possible costs and dynamics of such relationships, areas touched on in 
this paper. 
CASE STUDY: AN IT OUTSOURCING VENTURE 
Gigante is a large Australian company involved in the development and provision of IT 
products and services. The company operates mainly in its local Australian market where it 
is one of the dominant players. In 1992, recognising the need for a much greater presence in 
the international arena, it took over a much smaller player, Cowboys Inc., who were already 
operating very successfully in what was, essentially, the same business. Although presented 
to the public as an amicable merger, the marriage was, in effect, a hostile takeover. One 
immediate impact of this was that many of Cowboys best and most experienced technical 
and managerial staff walked out the door in the first 12 months following the merger. 
Despite this, Cowboys (now re-badged as Gigante’s International Division) continued to 
operate very successfully. Rapid response to new circumstances (particularly technological 
advances, new customer requirements and competitors actions) was the key to their 
success. Mainstream Gigante, largely because of the extensive scope of its operations and 
its size, was much more slow-moving, operating within a mechanistic, highly bureaucratic 
organisational structure. In contrast, International displayed many of the characteristics of 
the smaller, organic structural paradigm. In particular, communications lines were flexible 
and uncluttered and scant regard was paid to formal policies and procedures. International 
was able to operate within this preferred mode largely because of its General Manager who, 
apart from being highly respected and well liked by his team, was regarded as an astute 
politician, intolerant of any outside interference in his Division’s operations. Thus he was 
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able to act as an effective buffer between International and the mainstream organisation. 
The Division’s geographical remoteness, plus minimum overlap between its operations and 
the rest of the organisation, also contributed to its independence. 
Nowhere was this style of working more evident than in International’s IT operations. Rapid 
changes to production lines, the customer base and specific customer demands meant that 
billing, orders and customer management systems had to be updated frequently and quickly. 
Typically, a salesman working offshore would place an urgent call to the IT Manager and: 1) 
request information required to finalise a quote; and 2) advise of system changes required to 
support his prospective customer’s particular product demands. Unless the quote 
information was provided overnight and the necessary system changes made within a 
month (at the outside), it was highly likely that the deal would fall through. These sales 
support requests were given top priority by the IT Department, activities were carried out ‘on-
the-fly’ and, despite (or because of) its small size (12 people), the Department had compiled 
an excellent and admirable record in meeting its deadlines. As such, it was considered to be 
a major source of competitive advantage for International and was generally held in high 
regard by colleagues – in sharp contrast to IT Departments in most organisations (OASIG, 
1996). 
This idyllic state of affairs came to an abrupt end in 1997 when Gigante entered into an 
outsourcing deal with Worldwide Information Technology (WIT). A major player in IT 
outsourcing, WIT had a hierarchical organisation structure, a predominately bureaucratic 
mode of working and a culture similar in many respects to that of Gigante. (The reader might 
well ask why an established and experienced player in the IT arena should outsource much 
of its IT operations to another company operating in the same general business domain? 
This is a question worthy of a study in its own right but a detailed investigation is beyond our 
scope here.) 
In this environment, the very features that were the essence of International’s strengths and 
successes now were jeopardised. In particular, to have any systems maintenance or 
enhancement work undertaken, work orders had to be prepared, and estimates and 
program specifications had to be developed. All these were then passed upwards through 
three layers of interface management on the Gigante side, then downwards through a 
similar number of layers on the WIT side and, finally, each work order had to be vetted by 
WIT’s Legal Department. Control, hierarchy and formal communication dampened the highly 
innovative culture – the previous emphasis on flexibility and freedom, the horizontal and 
informal. 
Unconsulted prior to the establishment of the outsourcing arrangement or during the 
preparation of detailed operating procedures (which were far from complete in a number of 
important respects), International found itself in a very difficult position. With the procedures 
as they stood, there was no way that its sales force or other operations management and 
staff could continue to receive the level of IT service they had become accustomed to and 
required: its staff lacked both the skills and the will to prepare the necessary documentation 
and to negotiate their way through the system; unacceptable delays were intrinsic in the 
procedures themselves; and the final blow came when their champion (the General 
Manager) was promoted to an offshore position. Their problems were exacerbated when the 
General Manager’s replacement displayed little understanding of the problems that 
outsourcing had generated and less inclination to tackle them (or even discuss them!). 
Moreover, he failed to comprehend the destruction of ‘the rose among the thorns’ of the 
organisation. 
Those in the IT Department have displayed considerable vigour in trying to obtain a better 
deal for the Department, its systems and its Division. Essentially, they have simply refused 
to relinquish control over their systems to WIT and the various parties involved in interface 
management, and have continued to enhance and maintain their systems themselves. The 
IT Manager, however, recognises that his resistance will inevitably have to end and is 
devoting most of his energies to securing a better deal for his Division, plus improved 
interface procedures. Moreover, while this state of affairs persists, International are not only 
wearing the cost of their own internal staff performing actual work on their systems, but are 
also paying WIT for that portion of their staff performing nominal work on International’s 
systems! 
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Perhaps the most depressing aspect of the whole case study, however, is the impact that 
the outsourcing venture has had on the International IT Department’s morale. Effectively, a 
vibrant (if unconventional) IT group, providing their customers with timely and excellent 
service, has been shattered – in our view, probably beyond repair. Some staff have already 
resigned (rather than take up the offer of moving across to WIT); most others are actively 
seeking alternative employment; and the IT Manager, while continuing to fight his rearguard 
action, is exhibiting some (understandable) signs of depression and even contemplating a 
move into academia – if nothing else, he will have a wealth of first-hand information with 
which to entertain his students! 
A SYSTEM DYNAMICS VIEW 
In arguing their case, International’s IT Department felt that they needed some quantitative 
support. Intuitively, they were certain that outsourcing would have a major negative impact 
on their bottom line but needed some means of demonstrating this. We were consulted and 
suggested they develop a system dynamics model. Once the basic rationale and approach 
(and, especially, the simulation capabilities of the ithink software employed) were outlined, 
the IT Manager readily agreed to our suggestion and the model presented in Figure 1 was 
developed. Note that, for the purposes of this paper, the model presented is somewhat 
simplified. 
Figure 1: Stock and Flow model of impact of delays on market share and revenue 
International, as its name implies, operated in a global marketplace. It was one of only eight 
companies marketing a very limited range of high-tech communications products – mostly to 
medium-to-large, distributed organisations. Each product was designed for (essentially) the 
same communications function and, at any given point in time, one product tended to 
dominate the market (while other products were towards the beginning or end of their 
lifecycles). The model presented in Figure 1 could be applied to any member of the product 
range but was parameterised using the dominant product and, of course, International’s 
operations relative to this particular product only. 
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At the time development of our model commenced, International had a 20% market share of 
the dominant product. Among the eight players, this placed it equal second overall but it was 
rapidly increasing its share – mostly at the expense of its two major rivals. Our clients were 
convinced that, within three months, they would be the clear leader – and, indeed, the trend 
seemed to suggest that this was a reasonable assumption. No other player had more that 
12% of the market. For the most part, International’s excellent performance was due to the 
superb IT support its sales staff received (discussed in the previous section). 
During modelling, a number of critical success factors were identified. Of these, there was 
almost universal agreement that the two most vital were: i) the delay in getting into a new 
(product) market; and ii) delays in responding to customer requirements after release of a 
new product. These are included in Figure 1 as the converters, init delay rel to comps (initial 
delay relative to competitors) and avge post imp delay rel to comps (average post-
implementation delay relative to competitors). These determine both the initial and current 
market share (init pct share and current pct share) and, together, these are used to calculate 
International’s market share for any quarter, quarterly share). Using this and freely available 
data on product traffic and lifecycle patterns, quarterly and cumulative traffic (market share) 
and revenue can easily be calculated (for both International and its competitors). The model 
was built up using data from obsolete products and those nearing the end of their lifecycle. It 
was validated (to the extent possible) against the performance of the (current) dominant 
product to the latest point in its lifecycle for which figures were available. Key simulation 
outputs (revenue and market share figures) were shown to closely match actual product 
performance. 
Having developed the model, we were then able to run various forms of sensitivity analysis. 
For example, Figure 2 illustrates the impact of variations in initial delays relative to 
competitors on market share (with graphs 1-5 corresponding to 4 weeks faster, 2 weeks 
faster, no difference, 2 weeks slower and 4 weeks slower respectively). A number of other 
graphs were produced as a result of our analyses and, collectively, these dramatically 
demonstrate the impact of both types of delay on International’s market share and revenue: 
i.e. the modelling exercise produced precisely the type of ‘ammunition’ the IT Department 
was seeking. 
Figure 2: Delay impact on traffic share 
As noted, however, the IT Department’s attempts to utilise these results have met with little 
success. In retrospect, there was always a fair chance this would eventuate, given that key 
decision makers were not included in the model building process (Vennix, 1996). Vennix’s 
advice is sound and, in an ideal world, key stakeholders would always be involved in the 
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development of important decision support models. The reality, though, is that, in many 
modelling situations, this is simply not possible. For example, in the case under review here, 
the size of the organisation, stakeholders’ other responsibilities, stakeholders’ geographical 
dispersion and severe internal and external pressures on Gigante at the time of the study, all 
mitigated against our attempts to get ‘buy in’ and active participation from the more 
influential decision makers. Moreover, even if we had managed to realise our desired levels 
of participation, we doubt it would have made a great deal of difference to the eventual 
outcome: i.e. other factors - notably power/ political considerations were always going to 
make life very difficult for both International and, particularly, its IT Department. We turn our 
attention to these factors in the following section. 
INTERNATIONAL’S INFLUENCE ATTEMPT: A WIDER VIEW 
Gigante’s International Division (and, particularly, its IT Department) could clearly see the 
devastation the outsourcing decision would wreak on their business. In their attempts to 
alleviate the impact of this decision, they employed rational arguments. As we have seen, 
however, much decision making in organisations is not rational. In this instance, 
International’s concerns were dwarfed by a much bigger ‘game’ and, here, their lack of any 
real political ‘clout’ counted very much against them. In the causal-loop diagram presented in 
Figure 3, we have attempted to represent some of the major influences we detected as part 
of this wider game. 
Figure 3: Impact of allowing outsourcing exceptions 
Organisations enter into IT outsourcing agreements for many reasons. During this study, we 
heard considerable conjecture as to the ‘real’ reasons behind the Gigante/ WIT deal, but 
press reports at the time consistently nominated major cost savings as Gigante’s principal 
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motive for entering into the contract (one of the largest IT contracts ever signed by an 
Australian company). 
A special Program Management team (abbreviated as pm in Figure 3) was formed to 
manage Gigante’s side of the alliance. From Figure 3, it can be seen that their performance 
had a major effect on the success of the outsourcing venture. Furthermore, since most of 
Gigante’s products require substantial IT support, outsourcing operations had a significant 
impact on product performance and this, in turn, directly influenced Gigante’s bottom line. In 
addition, the direct link from outsourcing perf to Gigante profit indicates that outsourcing, in 
itself, was expected to contribute to profit through greatly decreased IT costs. Thus, this 
portion of the diagram effectively mirrors Gigante’s official outsourcing policy and views. 
However, other important factors were also at work. In particular, Gigante’s executive, the 
Project Management team and the outsourcing agent (WIT) all stood to gain (and lose) 
much from the outsourcing venture and links from Project Management team and agent 
performance to rewards/ profit are clearly identified in Figure 3. In this context, it is easy to 
see that exceptions (exemptions from the outsourcing arrangement) could clearly not be 
tolerated. That is, apart from reducing the agent’s profit, every exception allowed was likely 
to have a damaging impact on general perceptions of Project Management team 
performance. Thus, Project Management implemented a policy to the effect that exceptions 
would not be allowed under any circumstance – no matter what benefits specific cases might 
have for individual products (and the systems and personnel that supported these). To 
complete the picture, outsourcing can be a very risky business (Aubert et al., 2001) and 
there were many (inside and outside Gigante) who doubted the wisdom of this particular 
venture. Consequently, perceptions of the performance of Gigante’s executive were closely 
linked to both the outsourcing operations themselves and the Project Management team. 
Looked at in a (seemingly) rational light, the decision not to exempt International and their 
systems from the outsourcing deal seems bizarre – ensuring as it did the eventual 
destruction of International’s leadership in their particular product market, plus the additional 
loss of a number of committed, scarce and valued IT specialists. If we view the situation 
from a power/ political perspective, though, the events that transpired begin to make sense. 
Pfeffer (1981; 1992) argues that while organisations have corporate (official) goals, 
individual parties within these organisations have (unofficial) local goals: where there is a 
clash between corporate and local goals, local goals generally take precedence. Pfeffer 
(1981) goes on to define power as ‘a force, a store of political influence through which 
events can be affected’, while politics ‘involves those activities or behaviours through which 
power is developed and used within organisational settings’. In short, power is ‘a property of 
the system at rest’ while politics is ‘power in action’. Pfeffer’s stores of influence are power 
sources and, in his earlier work (1981:97-135) he discusses the more significant of these 
within a very neat classification scheme. Using this scheme, we may investigate the impact 
of a decision to allow outsourcing exceptions on the power sources of the three parties 
discussed earlier in this section. Our results are presented in Table 1. 
Clearly, all parties stood to lose substantially. The Project Management team and the agent 
would have lost (shared) control over the provision of important resources (International’s 
systems and IT personnel) to the organisation at large and, in addition, the agent would 
have received less funds for its services. Furthermore, without control over these systems 
and specialist personnel, the two parties’ total level of expert knowledge (a vital source of 
power in organisations) would have suffered. Gigante’s executive, however, would have 
been largely unaffected (in a direct sense) with respect to these power sources. 
Perhaps, most interesting of all are the final three power sources in Table 1 and the fact that 
all parties would have suffered here. As Pfeffer (1981:54-57) has argued, reputations are 
built upon perceptions and, as noted previously, allowing exceptions would have had a 
major negative impact on perceptions of Project Team performance. Actual performance 
also has an effect on perceived pm perf and both these factors are clearly identified in our 
causal-loop diagram. The link between perceptions of Project team and Gigante’s executive 
performance is also identified. However, in Pfeffer’s scheme, there is also a clear link from 
perceptions (of both power and performance) to prestige and extending our model to specify 
this additional relationship is a relatively simple exercise. Finally, where an organisation unit 
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or group has a strong, united, common view on issues, they derive power from consensus 
(Pfeffer, 1981:122-124). Pfeffer emphasises that this is a particularly formidable power 
source but one that can easily be dissipated by significant change. Allowing exceptions 
would certainly fit into this category. 
 Project Management Gigante Executive Outsourcing 
Agent 
Resource provision - 0 - 
Resource dependence - 0 - 
Expert knowledge - 0 - 
Consensus - - - 
Reputation - - - 
Prestige - - - 
A ‘-’ means a negative impact, a ‘0’ means no impact and a ‘+’ means a positive impact 
Table 1: Potential impact on power sources of a decision to grant International an 
outsourcing exemption on the Project Management team, Gigante’s Executive and the 
Outsourcing Agent 
CONCLUSION 
While collaboration strategy is not the answer to all organisational ills, it can be an effective 
tool, although its success relates to a number of key variables touched on in this paper, the 
critical one being that of managing organisational power plays and political activity 
effectively. 
What we find in this case study is a failure to learn from the process and to adjust 
collaboration with an elasticity that would allow organisational roses to bloom rather than be 
crushed underfoot by cooperative rigidities of structure, process, and regulatory ritual. 
Furthermore, we see considerable self-interest and a consequent disregard for the vital role 
played by individuals in collaboration processes. The results are that in accentuating rules 
and efficiency, strategies for innovation and organisational learning were forgotten. This 
rigidity, coupled with highly dysfunctional political activity, simply prevented realisation of 
new possibilities available in multilateral organisational collaboration (Luts, 1997). Certainly 
the case demonstrates many of the pitfalls and costs of inter-organisational collaboration, 
especially so far as stakeholders in Cowboys/ International were concerned. Delineating 
longer term benefits and overall organisational performance for Gigante may be more 
difficult to assess but will be eagerly pursued. 
Finally, organisational change increases the ‘turf warfare’ of change management – and part 
of this includes the more macro dimensions of organisation prestige and reputation. In the 
realm of any organisation’s corporate communication, the most critical function is that of the 
organisation’s image and identity, important within the organisation but perhaps even more 
vital to the external community and many of its key stakeholders. Diverse stakeholders may 
have varying images of an organisation but reputation and identity should be consistent, a 
hallmark that distinguishes it instantly in a globally competitive environment where attracting 
the right customers, investors and employees is crucial. Image, identity, prestige and 
reputation are today hallmarks of the qualitative intangibles based in perceptions and hard 
fought for. They are part of an organisation’s intellectual capital in the broad sense and can 
be irrevocably damaged even by one instance of poor management. Put simply, the 
organisation is the message and poor communication (arising, for example, from the 
politically-motivated turf warfare referred to above) can destroy it instantly! 
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